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CONSENT TO OPERATIVE PROCEDURFS
By Robert E. Powell*
INTRODUCTIONt
The law is reasonably well established that, before a
physician or surgeon may operate upon or treat a patient,
he must, in one form or another, obtain the consent of the
patient, if he is mentally capable of giving it, or, if not,
of his guardian, unless the circumstances are such that
they demand immediate attention for the preservation of
his life, limb or health.' The basic concept behind the
legal requirement that there be consent to operative proce-
dure is, as expressed in Rolater v. Strain,2 that:
"Under a free government at least, the free citi-
zen's first and greatest right, which underlies all others
* Of the Maryland Bar; A.B. 1957, Johns Hopkins University; LL.B. 1960,
University of Maryland.
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- the right to the inviolability of his person, in other
words, his right to himself - is the subject of universal
acquiescence, and this right necessarily forbids a phy-
sician or surgeon, however skillful or eminent, who
has been asked to examine, diagnose, advise and pre-
scribe ... , to violate without permission the bodily
integrity of his patient by a major or capital operation,
placing him under anaesthetic for that purpose, and
operating on him without his consent or knowledge."8
In short, an unconsented to touching of another person's
body constitutes a tort.4
Normally consent acts as an absolute bar to an action in
tort based on an improper touching of one's body.' How-
ever, there are certain types of cases wherein it constitutes
no defense for a physician or surgeon to prove that his
patient consented.6 Conversely, there are cases wherein it
is immaterial whether or not consent was given.7 However,
in the vast majority of cases there must be consent in one
form or another. There are three forms of consent:
express,8 implied in fact,9 and implied in law.10 Beyond
8Id., 97 quoting verbatim 37 Chicago Legal News 213. See also Schloen-
dorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)
wherein the court said:
"Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault,
for which he is liable in damages."
'It is noted that not all jurisdictions are in full accord on the nature of
the tort. The majority clearly holds that an unconsented-bo operation
constitutes an assault and battery, or trespass vi et armi8; Mohr v.
Williams, supra, n. 1; Sullivan v. Montgomery, 155 Misc. 488, 279 N.Y.S.
575 (1935) ; Rogers v. Sells, 178 Okla. 103, 61 P. 2d 1018 (1936) ; Hively
v. Higgs, 120 Or. 588, 253 P. 363, 53 A.L.R. 1052 (1927). In other cases
it has been held that the action was one for negligence; McClees v. Cohen,
158 Md. 60, 148 A. 124 (1930) ; Angulo v. Hallar, 137 Md. 227, 232, 112 A.
179 (1920) ; Griffin v. Norman, 192 N.Y.S. 322 (1922). It seems clear that
the action is really one for assault and battery, but that a distinction is
made where a doctor makes a mistake and operates on the wrong part of
the body. In such cases there clearly is n want of reasonable care. How-
ever, some courts have demonstrated their difficulty in drawing the true
distinction. The basic problem Is probably due to a lack of actual intent
to commit an assault and battery and thereby Inflict harm.
IPRossm, LAW OF TORTS (2nd ed. 1955) § 9, p. 32; CLARK & LINDSRLL,
LAW OF TORTS (8th ed. 1929) 173.
6 See discussion of illegal operations, infra, circa, ns. 90-96.
See discussion on operations required, by law, infra, circa, fs. 13-16.
6 King v. Carney, 85 Okla. 62, 204 P. 270 (1922) ; Farber v. Olkon, 40
Cal. 2d 503, 254 P. 2d 520 (1953).
9McGuire v. Rix, 118 Neb. 434, 225 N.W. 120, 123 (1929), where the
court said, ".... consent may be implied from circumstances and an opera-
tion may be demanded by an emergency without consent"; Sullivan v.
Montgomery, 155 Misc. 448, 279 N.Y.S. 575 (1935) ; Browning v. Hoffman,
90 W. Va. 568, 111 S.E. 492 (1922).
l' Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912). From the cases
it is very difficult to ascertain in what instances consent is implied in
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that, consent whether express or implied may be either
general or restrictive in nature, or its nature may be deter-
mined by some special circumstance which either brought
the patient to the physician or arose after surgery had
been undertaken.
In order to understand the nature of consent it is neces-
sary at the outset to have some understanding of the legal
relationship between the physician and his patient. This
relationship is essentially contractual in nature." More
often than not the contract is raised by implication from
the dealings between the parties, and in a like manner the
acts to be performed by the parties are impliedly defined.
Thus, if a patient consults a surgeon for the purpose of
removing a tumor from his arm, a contract is entered into
which requires the surgeon to remove the tumor. There-
fore, he must not digress from that contract and also
remove the patient's appendix. In short, the surgeon must
operate in accordance with the agreement made between
the parties. Consent for the operation or treatment arises
from the contract and is given only in connection with
what the parties understood was to be done. Thus, in the
illustration above, the patient did not consent to the per-
formance of any operation other than the removal of the
tumor, and if the surgeon removed the appendix as well,
he would be liable in damages. It is noted that in such a
case the patient might well rely on an action for breach
of contract." However, he may base his action on a tortious
assault and battery and recover punitive damages which
are not available in contract actions.
fact and in what ones it is implied by law. There is a direct conflict as
to whether, in an emergency, consent is implied in fact or In law. For the
purposes of this article it is unnecessary to draw a line of distinction, and
hence, none is suggested.
nAngulo v. Hallar, 137 Md. 227, 232, 112 A. 179 (1920); Findlay v.
Board of Sup'rs of County of 'Mohave, 72 Ariz. 58, 230 P. 2d 526 (1951)
Cartwright v. Bartholomew, 83 Ga. App. 503, 64 S.E. 2d 323 (1951);
Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E. 2d 330 (1955); Colvin v.
Smith, 276 App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S. 2d 794 (1949) ; Helms v. Day, 215 S.W. 2d
356 (Tex. 1948).
"Robins v. Finestone, id., Angulo v. Haller, id., 232, where the court,
quoting from Dashiell v. Griffith, 84 Md. 363, 35 A. 1094 (1896), said:
"[T]hat a physician or surgeon who holds himself out to the world
to practice his profession, by so doing impliedly contracts with those
who employ him, that he possesses a reasonable degree of care, skill,
and learning, and he is, therefore, bound to exercise and is liable for
the want of reasonable care . ... "
It was there indicated that the surgeon could be held liable on a theory of
breach of warranty of contract, or for tort. It is noted, however, that the
legal test for breach of warranty in this instance is the same as that
for negligence, i.e., whether the surgeon acts with reasonable care.
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It is the purpose of this article to explore the various
forms and natures of consent and the legal doctrines which
have developed in relation thereto, and to illustrate those
areas in which difficulties most often arise. It is hoped that
some clarity will result as to the law in those areas in
which physicians and surgeons have shown serious concern.
OPERATIONS REQUIRED By LAW
Despite the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution
of the United States, the several states may require that
certain operations be performed in order to protect so-
ciety as a whole.13 Thus, the Supreme Court has upheld
the validity of laws making it mandatory that an individual
be vaccinated, 4 and under special circumstances be ster-
ilized.'5 Similarly it has been held that a state may require
that prostitutes be examined in order to protect the public
from venereal diseases. 6 In such cases the patient has no
right either to give or refuse consent, but might have a
right to choose the doctor who is to perform the operation
or examination. The law itself provides the necessary con-
sent for the performance of the operation, and in many
instances makes it mandatory that the operation be per-
formed and imposes a criminal penalty for failure to com-
ply. Therefore, where a state law validly requires the
performance of an operation, there is no consenual problem.
EXPRESS CONSENT
There is little difficulty in regard to consent, if the
patient, either on his own initiative or by solicitation at
the instance of a physician or a nurse consents either in
writing or verbally to the undertaking of operative proce-
dures in an attempt to remedy the pathological condition
of which he complains. As indicated, express consent can
be obtained either by having the patient sign a written
statement or through the making of an oral agreement.
In either case, since the agreement between the physician
and his patient is contractual in nature, for there to be
valid consent it must be clear that both parties under-
stand the nature of the undertaking and what the possible
3Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200 (1927).1, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, id.
Buck v. Bell, supra, n. 13, 207, where the Court said:
"The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough
to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes .... Three generations of imbe-
ciles are enough."
'
6 Laux v. Stitt, 186 Wash. 180, 57 P. 2d 321 (1936).
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as well as expected results might be. As will be more
thoroughly discussed later, it will be no defense for a sur-
geon to prove that the patient had given his consent, if
the consent was not given with a true understanding of
the nature of the operation to be performed, the serious-
ness of it, the organs of the body involved, the disease or
incapacity sought to be cured, and the possible results.17
IMPLIED CONSENT
There are many instances in which it is impractical to
obtain express consent, and yet consent will arise by im-
plication from the circumstances. Typical situations in
which consent to operative procedures may be implied
are where: (1) a patient on consulting a physician or sur-
geon fails to expressly request the specific treatment or
operation deemed desirable, but also does not raise any
objection thereto;18 (2) a surgeon, in performing an opera-
tion for which consent was given and while the patient is
under anaesthesia, finds a related operation also desirable
and deems it expedient to proceed with both operations; 19
and (3) while performing a major operation, he discovers
a situation which can be cured or remedied by minor sur-
gery and deems it wise to proceed.2" Interrelated with the
question as to whether consent can be implied in cases such
as those mentioned above, is the question as to how long
consent, once given, will continue, and when consent has
been exhausted or surpassed.
1. Request of Medical Assistance
Under the law, when a patient goes to a physician or
surgeon and submits himself for examination, diagnosis,
and possibly surgery or treatment involving body contact,
with the request, either express or implied, that whatever
is necessary to give relief be done, then the doctor is safe
to assume that his acts are consented to and will only be an-
swerable for his lack of proper knowledge, skill or care.2' In
1 7 Infra, circa, ne. 100-127.
IsMcClees v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60, 148 A. 124 (1930) ; Dashiell v. Griffith,
84 Md. 363, 35 A. 1094 (1896); State v. Housekeeper, 70 Md. 162, 16 A.
382 (1889); McGuire v. Rix, 118 Neb. 434, 225 N.W. 120 (1929); Dicenzo
v. Berg, 340 Pa. 305, 16 A. 2d 15 (1940).
19 Delahunt v. Finton, 244 Mich. 226, 221 N.W. 168 (1928); Higley v.
Jeffrey, 44 Wyo. 37, 8 P. 2d 96 (1932) ; Caron v. Gagnon, 68 Quebec S.C.
155 (Quebec 1939).
Barnett v. Bachrach, 34 A. 2d 626 (D.C. Mun. App. 1943); Tabor v.
Scobee, 254 S.W. 2d 474, 477 (,Ky. 1951) (dictum).
1 Supra, n. 18.
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McGuire v. Rix2 the plaintiff patient was taken to the
hospital where she requested that the defendant reduce a
comminuted fracture of the astragalus of her right foot.
She expressly consented to being anaesthesized, but not to
an operation. While the patient was unconscious, the de-
fendant found it necessary to operate and did so without
delay. The court held that consent for the performance of
the operation could be implied from the fact that the
plaintiff had requested that the fracture be reduced and
had consented to the administration of an anaesthetic.
Similarly, in Dicenzo v. Berg,23 where the plaintiff had sus-
tained fractures of certain vertebrae when struck in the
head, it was held that consent to operate upon and above
the neck in accordance with usual medical practice was
implied, although the plaintiff while fully understanding
the circumstances had expressly prohibited the making of
an incision above the neck. Usually an express prohibition
will fix liability upon a surgeon if he disregards it.24 How-
ever, in the Dicenzo case implied consent could be found
because the patient had requested that necessary medical
care be provided, and that which was provided was in ac-
cordance with customary medical practices. Thus, it seems
relatively clear that, where a patient requests either by
implication or expressly that remedial steps be taken, a
physician will not be held liable for performing an opera-
tion which is generally accepted to be proper for the care
of the specific ailment, unless he is negligent in performing
the operation.
2. Consent to a Related Operation Sometimes
Implies Consent
It has been found in a few cases that consent could be
implied for the performance of an operation related to
the one for which consent was specifically given, where it
was impractical to attempt to gain consent and it was
reasonably probable that consent would readily be given.25
In Delahunt v. Finton,2 6 the defendant, in making a diag-
nostic examination of the plaintiff with his consent, ad-
ministered an anaesthetic and passed a filiform bougie
through the urethral passage into the bladder. On attempt-
ing to remove the instrument it was discovered that it had
118 Neb. 434, 225 N.W. 120 (1929).
23340 Pa. 305, 16 A. 2d 15 (1940).
" Chambers v. Nottebaum, 96 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1957) ; Bishop v. Shurly,
237 Mich. 76, 211 N.W. 75 (1926). See discussion infra, circa, ns. 33-36.
Supra, n. 19.
Supra, n. 19.
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become hooked in the bladder, and the defendant imme-
diately operated. The court held that the operation was
necessary and that consent therefore was clearly implied.
Of like import was Higley v. Jeffrey,2 wherein it was held
that the defendant was not liable for reopening an incision
to remove a needle, after performing a consented to opera-
tion in the course of which the needle had been misplaced.
The court there clearly indicated that the second operation
was closely related to the first and made necessary by the
first, and therefore consent could be implied from that
given for the first operation.
Exactly how closely related the law requires the two
operations to be is far from clear. There is no question
but that there was a close relationship in the two cases
discussed above. However, in Caron v. Gagnon,28 wherein
the patient consented to the performance of an appendec-
tomy and the defendant surgeon also removed her ovaries
which were diseased, the court implied consent for the
removal of the ovaries from the fact that the patient had
stated that she hoped she would never have to undergo
another operation. It is clear that the surgeon could have
closed his incision and later obtained consent to remove
the patient's ovaries without endangering her life or health.
Many courts would require that consent be obtained under
such circumstances,29 but here the operation was in the
same general region and the court felt that the patient
would have given her consent. Perhaps the broadest
view taken by any court is that expressed in Bennan v.
Parsonnet20 In that case the defendant surgeon while
operating for a left hernia discovered a dangerous condi-
tion to exist on the right side as well and performed both
operations. In finding that the second operation was con-
sented to by implication the court said:
"The surgical employment of anaethesia has, as
matter of common knowledge, not only eliminated the
possibility of obtaining the patient's consent during
the operation, but has also had other radical effects of
which notice must be taken. * * * The conclusion,
therefore, to which we are led is that when a person
has selected a surgeon to operate upon him, and has
21 Supra, n. 19.
21 Supra, n. 19.
Beringer v. Lackner, 331 Il. App. 591, 73 N.E. 2d 620 (1947) ; Rothe
v. Hull, 352 Mo. 926, 180 S.W. 2d 7 (1944); Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okla.
572, 137 P. 96 (1913) ; Paulsen v. Gundersen, 218 Wis. 578, 260 N.W. 448
(1935).
w°83 N.J.L. 20, 83 A. 948 (1912).
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appointed no other person to represent him during the
period of unconsciousness that constitutes a part of
such operation, the law will by implication constitute
such surgeon the representative pro hac vice of his
patient, and will, within the scope to which such im-
plication applies, cast upon him the responsibility of
so acting in the interest of his patient that the latter
shall receive the full benefit of that professional judg-
ment and skill to which he is legally entitled."'"
It is a rather unique and broad concept that the law should
recognize the surgeon to be the representative pro hac vice
of the patient, since in many instances other courts have
indicated that a close relative could not provide the re-
quired consent unless the patient is, when conscious, men-
tally incapable of consenting.32 However, it is noted that
in the above quote the court restricted the representative
authority of the surgeon to the general scope of medical
care for which the original operation was performed. In
short there must be some relationship between the two
operations.
3. Restriction and Exhaustion of Consent
If a patient gives consent and either expressly or im-
pliedly places a restriction thereon or gives express in-
structions, such a restriction or instructions must be com-
plied with, and an operation which is not performed in
accordance therewith will be held to be tortious. In Rolater
v. Strain3 the plaintiff had expressly prohibited the re-
moval of any bones while the defendant operated to drain
a puncture wound in her foot. The surgeon removed a
sesamoid bone, and the court held that in so doing he had
committed an actionable assault and battery. The under-
lying concept is that, where a physician agrees with his
patient to use a designated anaesthetic or to perform a
particular operation, he is bound to such agreement unless
some unusual circumstance arises from which consent can
be implied regardless of the prohibition. 4 Further, a
patient has a right to expressly prohibit surgery even if
such is necessary to preserve his life, and if such prohibition
Id., 949-950.
Chambers v. Nottebaum, 96 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1957) ; Bishop v. Shurly,
237 Mich. 76, 211 N.W. 75 (1926) ; Sullivan v. Montgomery, 155 Misc. 448,
279 N.Y.S. 575 (1935).
'4Supra, n. 29.
'4 Bishop v. Shurly, supra, n. 32.
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is present the operation cannot be legally performed.15
In relation thereto the physician cannot be held liable for
malpractice if he does not operate even though his failure
to operate would be criticized in medical circles. 6 It may
be that such a prohibition is evidence of a diseased mind
and is invalid, and at least arguably would not prevent
surgery. A person who is non compos mentis is incapable
of consenting and conversely should be incapable of re-
fusing consent. Therefore, if there is imminent peril to
the patient's life, especially if self-inflicted, consent may be
implied although expressly refused. It is also clear that
consent cannot be refused if the operation is one compelled
by law since the mandate of the law is directed to both
physician and patient.38
Exactly when a surgeon has surpassed the consent of
the patient is not absolutely clear. However, it is possible
to give the issue some clarity by an examination of the
cases wherein it was found that consent had been ex-
hausted. In Rothe v. Hull 9 the plaintiff had employed the
defendant surgeon to remove her appendix. On operating
the defendant not only removed her appendix but also her
Fallopian tubes. There was evidence that the defendant
had given the plaintiff general authority to relieve her
condition and further that while the operation was in
progress the defendant advised the plaintiff's husband of
the condition of the tubes and he may have authorized their
removal. Nonetheless, the court held that the evidence only
revealed general authority with relation to the appendix
and therefore by proceeding to remove the Fallopian tubes
the defendant had committed a tort. Similarly, it has been
held that consent was exceeded where a surgeon, in ob-
taining necessary facia to separate and cushion the deep
tendons in the plaintiff's hand, without gaining consent,
removed facia from her thigh;40 where the defendant re-
moved the plaintiff's right testicle during an operation
for the removal of a hernia in the right groin;4'1 where the
defendant performed an ossiculectomy on plaintiff's left ear
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E.
92, 93 (1914) ; Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 137 P. 96 (1913) ; Bishop v.
Sh urly, supra, n. 32 - agreement made by a surgeon is binding upon him.
Littlejohn v. Arbogast, 86 Ill. App. 505 (1901) ; Childers v. Frye, 201
N.C. 42, 158 S.E. 744 (1931).
87 Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal. 2d 503, 254 P. 2d 520 (1953) ; Pratt v. Davis,
224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906).
TBuck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1929) ; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11 (1905).
81352 Mo. 926, 180 -S.W. 2d 7 (1944).
Franklyn v. Peabody, 249 Mich. 363, 228 N.W. 681 (1930).
,1 Markart v. Zeimer, 67 Cal. App. 363, 227 P. 683 (1924).
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which he discovered to be diseased while supposedly op-
erating on the right ear; 2 and where the defendant re-
moved a sesamoid bone in making an incision to drain a
puncture wound against instructions." A similar result was
seen where the defendant removed a fibroid tumor while
the plaintiff was under anaesthesia only for the purpose
of allowing a thorough examination of the tumor;" and
where defendant operated for the purpose of performing a
currettement, but instead performed a complete hysterec-
tomy.45 Dentists have also been held liable where they
removed two molar teeth instead of removing the patient's
baby roots;46 and where they removed an impacted tooth
while the patient was under anaesthesia for general dental
work.47
The problem becomes more acute where a surgeon on
performing a minor operation finds that the condition is
more serious than he had anticipated. In Paulsen v. Gun-
dersen5 it was held that consent had been exceeded where
the defendant after obtaining consent for a "simple"
mastoid operation performed a "radical" mastoid opera-
tion. Similarly, it was held in Wall v. Brim4 9 that consent
was exceeded when the surgeon after making his incision
discovered that the operation would be more serious than
anticipated, but proceeded anyhow.
From the above cases it can be seen that legal liability
may arise although consent was initially given if a surgeon
also operates in a different region of the body or upon a
different organ of the body than anticipated, or if he pro-
ceeds with an operation which is more serious than the
one for which consent was given. The basic idea is simply
that, if the circumstances do not present imminent peril
to life or limb the patient has a right to decide for him-
self whether he desires to have the operation performed,
and if different circumstances are discovered while he is
unconscious he has a right to know those circumstances
since had he been aware of them he may have refused to
give consent. It might reasonably be asked why consent
could not be implied in the cases immediately above if
0 M ohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
" Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 137 P. 96 (1913).
14 Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E.
92 (1941).
Beringer v. Lackner, 331 Ill. App. 591, 73 N.E. 2d 620 (1947).
McClees v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60, 148 A. 124 (1930).
47 Francis v. Brooks, 24 Ohio App. 136, 156 N.E. 609 (1926).
48218 Wis. 578, 260 N.W. 448 (1935).
- 138 F. 2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943).
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it was implied in Caron v. Gagnon5" and Bennan v. Par-
sonnet.5 Some explanation lies in the fact that the juris-
dictions wherein those cases were decided adopt a more
liberal view than most. However, some distinction can be
made in that the patient in the Caron case expressed a
strong feeling that she hoped she would never have to
undergo surgery again, and in the Bennan case there was
a very close relation of symptoms between each hernia
condition and in addition there was some question as to
whether the right hernia did not present an emergency.
4. Doctrine of Emergency
As has been indicated above, if the circumstances of a
given case present a danger to the life, limb or health of
the patient and the surgeon is unable to obtain the consent
of the patient before operating, either because he is uncon-
scious, intoxicated, insane or otherwise legally incapable
of consenting, consent will be implied."' It is noted, how-
ever, that if the patient, although dying, refuses to consent,
no consent will be implied. The primary problem re-
lating to the emergency doctrine lies in attempting to give
an adequate definition to what the law considers to be an
emergency. How grave a danger must exist, and to what
must it relate? Must there be a danger to the patient's
life? If only a danger to the patient's health is required,
what is the definition of "health" as used in this connection?
Additional queries may arise as to when, in the stage of
medical assistance, can the doctrine be invoked? Is it ap-
plicable only where an emergency is immediately detecta-
ble, or can it be invoked to extend an operation already in
progress or to perform an unrelated operation which will
remedy the situation which was unknown until the original
operation had been commenced?
The emergency doctrine, as it has been most often stated
by the courts, was enunciated in Mohr v. Williams54 in the
following words:
"If a person should be injured to the extent of
rendering him unconscious, and his injuries were of
068 Quebec S.C. 155 (Quebec 1939).
'83 N.J.L. 20, 83 A. 948 (1912).
SJackovach v. Yocom, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N.W. 444 (1931); Luka v.
Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912) ; Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn.
261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905); King v. Carney, 85 Okla. 62, 204 P. 270, 26
A.L.R. 1032 (1922); of., Rolaiter v. Strain, 178 Okla. 103, 61 P. 2d 1018
(1936) ; Tabor v. Seobee, 254 S.W. 2d 474 (Ky. 1951).
Supra, n. 35.
95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
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such a nature as to require prompt surgical attention,
a physician called to attend him would be justified in
applying such medical or surgical treatment as might
reasonably be necessary for the preservation of his life
or limb . . .
At first glance the standards set by the above doctrine
would appear to be clear. However, as soon as one attempts
to use it as a guide in practice the ambiguity of the test
becomes readily apparent. What does "reasonably neces-
sary" mean? Does "limb" only include the legs and arms,
or will it be interpreted to include a digit? Since many
courts have extended the rule so as to include life, limb
and health, what does the term "health" include?
Although the doctrine is vague some clarity can be
gained by examining the fact situations of certain cases.
In Mohr v. Williams, supra, the defendant surgeon found
a serious condition to exist in the plaintiff's left ear, while
he was supposedly operating on the right ear. Although
there was a good possibility that if an ossiculectomy was
not performed on the left ear in the near future the plain-
tiff would have had her hearing seriously impaired, none-
theless the court could not find that the situation warranted
the operation without first obtaining the patient's express
consent.
On the other hand, in Luka v. Lowrie,56 the court had
no difficulty in finding that an emergency existed where
the plaintiff had suffered a compound disarticulation of the
bones of his foot. It is noted that in that case the defend-
ant was called in after four other physicians had examined
the foot and agreed that surgery was necessary. Thus, it
was clear that the operation was reasonably necessary.
Similarly, an emergency has been found to have justified
surgical treatment where the patient's leg was amputated
after developing gas bacillus and gangrene;57 where the
patient's arm was amputated and head treated after he
was struck in the head while jumping from a freight car
and was dragged a considerable distance;58 where the plain-
tiff, a child, was forcefully taken to the hospital against
his wishes, after having had his foot run over by a train;59
and where chloroform from which the patient died was ad-
ministered during an operation to reduce a fracture of
Id., 15. Emphasis added.
171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912).
Browning v. Hoffman, 90 W. Va. 568, 111 S.E. 492 (1922).
Jackovach v. Yocom, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N.W. 444 (1931).
Ollet v. Pittsburg, C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 201 Pa. 361, 50 A. 1011 (1902).
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his arm.60 However, it was held that no emergency existed
where a surgeon felt it necessary to perform a tonsilec-
tomy while allegedly performing an operation on the
septum of the plaintiff's nose;61 where a surgeon removed
the seriously diseased tonsils and adenoid of the plaintiff's
child without consulting the plaintiff;6 2 where in perform-
ing an appendectomy, a spinal anaesthetic was administered
contrary to the plaintiff's instructions after he had reacted
badly to sodium pentothal; 3 where a surgeon amputated
the patient's leg which had been crushed and mangled 4
It is clear from the above cases that, if the emergency
presents an imminent danger to the patient's life, the
surgeon is justified in proceeding with an operation. How-
ever, it is not easy to deduce the minimum requirement.
In this regard at least two views have been indicated. Some
courts, probably in order to find the easiest answer to the
question, have adopted the view that the situation must
be such that death would likely result immediately or upon
failure to operate promptly.65 It is plain that this view is
entirely too restrictive and would prevent diligent sur-
geons from attempting to obviate serious physical handi-
caps. Nonetheless, in Tabor v. Scobee,e6 the Court of Ap-
peals of Kentucky, in holding that no emergency existed
sufficient to imply consent for the defendant to remove the
diseased Fallopian tubes of the plaintiff while operating to
remove her appendix, said:
"The evidence indicated that the removal of the
tubes probably would be necessary soon, that their re-
maining in the body in their swollen and infected
condition was dangerous, but it did not establish that
their removal was an emergency in the sense that
death would likely ensue immediately if the tubes were
not removed .... Although delay in their removal
might have proved harmful, even fatal, there still was
time to give the ... patient the opportunity to weigh
the fateful question."67
" Wells v. McGehee, 39 So. 2d, 196 (La. 1949).
11 Hively v. Higgs, 120 Or. 588, 253 P. 363 (1927).
6'Zoski v. Gaines, 271 Mich. 1, 260 N.W. 99 (1935); see also Moss v.
Rishworth, 222 S.W. 225 (Tex. 1920).
6 Chambers v. Nottebaum, 96 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1957).
1
4 Rogers v. Sells, 178 Okla. 103, 61 P. 2d 1018 (1936).
Taibor v. Scobee, 254 S.W. 2d 474 (Ky. 1951) ; Moss v. Rishworth, 222
S.W. 225 (Tex. 1920). This view may be explained in that the patients
were infants. See infra, circa, ns. 113-118.
m d.
e7 Supra, n. 65, 476-477. Emphasis added.
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But, compare King v. Carney" wherein the Appellate Court
of Oklahoma found that a surgeon acted justifiably in an
emergency in removing both the ovaries and Fallopian
tubes of the plaintiff during an operation to cure a lacera-
tion of her womb. The King case represents the more
widely accepted view that an operation may be commenced
or extended without first gaining express consent if con-
ditions are such that they endanger the life or health of
the patient. Under this theory there appears to be more
discretion placed in the surgeon and he is allowed to more
adequately perform his duties for the benefit of his patient.
An excellent illustration of the workings of the emergency
doctrine in a jurisdiction adopting the more liberal view
is seen in the opinion of the Municipal Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia in Barnett v. Bachrach.69 In that
case the defendant had operated upon the plaintiff, a preg-
nant woman, to relieve a condition which had been diag-
nosed to be tubal or extra-uterine pregnancy, but having
found her pregnancy to be normal proceeded to remove
an inflamed appendix. The court, in holding that an emer-
gency was present, analyzed the problem as follows:
"What was the surgeon to do? Should he have left
her on the operating table, her abdomen exposed, and
gone in search of her husband to obtain express au-
thority to remove the appendix? Should he have closed
the incision on the inflamed appendix and subjected
the patient, pregnant as she was, to the danger of a
general spread of the poison in her system, or to the
alternative danger and shock of a second, independent
operation to remove the appendix? Or should he have
done what his professional judgment dictated and pro-
ceed to remove the offending organ, regarded as it is
as a mere appendage serving no useful physiological
function and causing only trouble, suffering, and oft
times death."7
The court, thus recognized that probably there would not
have resulted immediate death had the surgeon attempted
to get consent, but stressed that there was danger to life
and probably imminent danger to the patient's health, as
well as possible loss of her child.7 The court took notice
of the fact that pregnancy combined with appendicitis
85 Okla. 62, 204 P. 270, 26 A.L.R. 1032 (1922).
'34 A. 2d 626 (D.C. Mun. App. 1943).
Id., 627-28.
Supra, n. 69, 628.
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often leads to abortion or miscarriage. Similarly the court
in Bennan v. Parsonnet72 in designating the surgeon to be
the representative of the patient in such circumstances said
that "the law by its constructive power will raise up such
a representative without which the welfare and even the
life of the patient may be needlessly sacrificed." Thus, it
becomes reasonably clear that a surgeon may feel safe in
operating or in extending an operation without having
obtained express consent, if the condition of the patient
presents an imminent danger to his life, limb or health,
except in those jurisdictions which demand that the pa-
tient's life be in immediate peril.
FACTORS PREVENTING CONSENT
There are various factors which may prevent effective
consent. Although consent may be expressly given, for
one reason or another it may not be valid. Generally speak-
ing consent may be vitiated by fraud, coercion, mistake or
because the patient is incapable of consenting because he
is a minor, intoxicated or non compos mentis.
1. Fraud
It is reasonably clear in the law that if consent for the
performance of an operation is obtained through fraud
such consent is invalid.7 3 Such fraud may be through a
misrepresentation of the character of an operation, 4 or
through a misrepresentation of the usual or expected results
thereof.7 5 In Hobbs v. Kizer7 6 it was found that the plaintiff's
consent was vitiated by fraud where she had consented to
an operation for the supposed removal of a vaginal abscess
and the defendant surgeon all the time intended to perform
an abortion which he had made necessary by having had
- 83 N.J.L. 20, 83 A. 948, 950 (1912). Emphasis added.
7 State v. Housekeeper, 70 Md. 162, 16 A. 382 (1889) (dictum) ; Hobbs v.
Kizer, 236 F. 681 (8th Cir. 1916); Bernbaum v. Seigler, 273 App. Div. 817,
76 N.Y.S. 2d 173 (1948); Kinney v. Lockwood Clinic Ltd., [1931] 4 D.L.R.
906 (Ontario S.C. 1931) ; Regina v. Case, 1 Eng. L. & Eq. Rep. 544 (1850).
For a general discussion see PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS (2nd ed. 1955) § 18,
p. 85 where he states that:
"If the plaintiff manifests consent to the defendant's act under a
mistake as to its nature or character, the consent will still be effective,
unless the defendant is aware of the mistake, or has misrepresented
the nature of his act."
It is noted that all that may be necessary to constitute fraud in these cases
is that an advantage be taken of 'the plaintiff's ignorance in order to per-
form an operation for which he may not have consented.
7, Hobbs v. Kizer, 236 F. 681 (8th Cir. 1916).
75Kinney v. Lockwood Clinic Ltd., supra, n. 73.
,
8Supra, n. 74.
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illicit relations with her. In England a similar result was
reached in Regina v. Case77 where a physician, while pur-
portedly treating a fourteen year old girl for suppressed
menstruation, had sexual intercourse with her under the
guise of providing proper medical treatment. Thus, it is
clear that operating or supposedly rendering treatment in
accordance with consent which was obtained by a conceal-
ment of the true nature of the act, is tortious.
In a like manner one will be liable, if he operates or
renders treatment without properly enlightening the pa-
tient as to the usual or expected results thereof. In Kinney
v. Lockwood Clinic, Ltd.7" the Supreme Court of Ontario
held that the consent given by a patient who had submitted
to an operation for Dupuytren's contraction was vitiated
because the defendant surgeon had not advised the patient
that the operation entailed considerable risk, and even
though successful might produce a more aggravated condi-
tion.
The question of fraud, as can be seen from the above
cases, has particular significance where a doctor intends
to perform a graver operation than the patient thinks when
he consents. Thus, in State v. Housekeeper79 the Court of
Appeals of Maryland, in talking of voluntary submission to
surgery, said:
"... if [a patient] voluntarily submit[s] [to a dan-
gerous surgical operation], her consent will be pre-
sumed, unless she was the victim of a false and fraudu-
lent misrepresentation, which is a material fact to be
established by proof." 0
2. Coercion
The law will not recognize consent, if it was given as a
result of coercive measures.8' One cannot by means of
threats, intimidation or force compel another to undergo
surgery. In Meek v. City of Loveland2 the plaintiff, after
being mistakenly shot by a policeman, was taken to a city
Supra, n. 73.
Supra, n. 75.
70 Md. 162, 16 A. 382 (1889).
0 Id., 170. It is noted that, if the fraud were perpetrated in obtaining the
permission of the parents or guardian of a person incapable of consenting,
the consent would also be invalid.
81 Meek v. City of Loveland, 85 Colo. 346, 276 P. 30 (1929). Where consent
is obtained through coercion or duress, It is considered that there was no
consent at all, since in fact the patient submits himself to the defendant's
act against his desires.
2Id.
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physician and over objection removed to an institution
wherein an operation was performed. The plaintiff had
constantly expressed a desire to consult his own physician.
The court held that the city physician, the surgeon and
the chief of police who had taken the plaintiff to the hos-
pital were liable. But compare Oltet v. Pittsburg, C.C.
& St. L. Ry. Co.8 3 wherein the crew of a railroad train
which had run over a boy crushing his foot took him to a
hospital over his protests. It was there held that no action
would lie for false imprisonment. Although appearing to
be irreconcilable, the Ollet case is distinguishable from the
Meek case on the grounds that the patient was a minor and
incapable of giving his consent, and an emergency there
existed which made it highly impractical to wait until the
boy's parents could be notified.14
3. Mistake
If a physician or surgeon through his own mistake
renders treatment or operates upon the wrong person or in
a manner which was contrary to the understanding be-
tween the parties, the submission of the person to such care
will not create implied consent.8 5 The law will not imply
consent for acts of medical treatment which neither party,
physician or patient, had contemplated. Thus, in Hershey
v. Peake86 it was held that the patient might recover for
malpractice where the defendant, a dentist, was authorized
to extract certain teeth but by mistake extracted the wrong
ones. Similarly, it has been held that consent was lacking
where a patient on returning to her physician's office
merely to obtain the results of a blood test, was given a
lumbar puncture meant for another;" and where an eye
specialist unnecessarily opened and cleaned out the right
antrum of the patient without obtaining his consent, while
believing him to be another patient.88 These cases are
8 201 Pa. 361, 50 A. 1011 (1902).
8 See discussion infra, circa, ns. 100-115. It is clear that coercion makes
little difference in relation to a patient who is incapable of consenting,
since even in absence of force or duress the consent would be invalid.
However, the problem could easily arise in cases dealing with such persons,
if by means of duress the patient's parent or guardian was compelled to
consent. In such an instance the consent would again be vitiated.8Hershey v. Peake, 115 Kan. 562, 223 P. 1113 (1924); Sullivan v.
McGraw, 118 Mich. 39, 76 N.W. 149 (1898) ; Gill v. Selling, 125 Or. 587,
267 P. 812 (1928) ; Samuelson v. Taylor, 160, Wash. 369, 295 P. 113 (1931).
In actuality the law indicates that an operation contrary to the under-
standing of the parties, regardless of what the reason is, constitutes
a breach of contract as well as a tort.8 Id.
87 Gill v. Selling, supra, n. 85.
Samuelson v. Taylor, supra, n. 85.
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closely akin to those involving an unwarranted extension
of an operation or the performance of an operation which
bears no relation to that for which consent was given.
However, here the element of intent is considerably
weaker, if not lacking altogether. It is reasonable to say
that the defendant would not have operated or would
have performed the proper operation had he not been con-
fused. For this reason the courts have been reluctant
to grant any punitive damages in such cases.89
4. Illegal Operations
There is a split of authority as to whether one can
consent to an unlawful operation. In many jurisdictions it
has been held that the consent of the plaintiff will not
avail as a defense in a civil suit for damages for injuries
arising out of an illegal 6peration.9 0 Thus, in Joy v. Brown9'
it was held that the next of kin of the patient, who had sub-
mitted and consented to the performance of an abortion
which was not necessary for the preservation of life, could
recover from the surgeon on the theory that ".... no person
may lawfully and validly consent to any act the very
purpose of which is to destroy human life."92 The general
theory behind the cases taking this position is that the
operation is a matter in which the state has an interest,
and since it transgresses the public peace, no person can
validly consent to such an act. Similarly in Miller v.
Bayer93 it was held that the patient upon whom an abortion
had been performed could recover from both the surgeon
and the paramour who had been charged with rape.
On the other hand, there are many jurisdictions which
have adopted a more modern view, which states that con-
sent to an immoral or illegal act constitutes a bar to re-
covery of damages for injury resulting therefrom.94 In
short the legal axiom volenti non fit injuria applies. Thus
8 Gill v. Selling, supra, n. 85; Samuelson v. Taylor, supra, n. 85. It is
clear that the doctrines discussed above are applicable in cases involving
persons incapable of consenting. However, there is some doubt as to
whether the courts would grant punitive damages, especially if the parent
or guardian of the patient was present.
90 Hancock v. Hullet, 203 Ala. 272, 82 So. 522 (1919) ; Martin v. Hardesty,
91 Ind. App. 239, 163 N.E. 610 (1928) ; Joy v. Brown, 173 Kan. 833, 252 P.
2d 889 (1953) ; Miller v. Bayer, 94 Wis. 123, 68 N.W. 869 (1896).
91 Id.
Joy v. Brown, 8upra, n. 90, 892.
Supra, n. 90.
Sayadoff v. Warda, 125 Cal. 2d- 626, 271 P. 2d 140 (1954) ; Nash v.
Meyer, 54 Idaho 283, 31 P. 2d 273 (1934) ; Goldnamer v. O'Brien, 98 Ky.
569, 33 S.W. 831 (1896); Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 154 N.E.
251 (1926) ; Martin v. Morris, 163 Tenn. 186, 42 S.W. 2d 207 (1931).
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in Miller v. Bennett95 it was held that the administrator
of the estate of a patient who had consented to being
aborted could not recover since the deceased was guilty
of moral turpitude and she, had she lived, could not have
recovered. Following the same line of reasoning it was
held in Sayadoff v. Warda96 that the paramour who had
arranged and financed the abortion could not be held
liable since the patient had expressly consented thereto.
Although the division of cases is rather distinctly
drawn, it would clearly appear that the modern trend is
to recognize the patient's consent to be a bar and thereby
apply the maxim volenti non fit injuria. The weight of
reason is clearly behind this position, since, if a court is to
allow a recovery for submission to the commission of a
crime, it is in effect rewarding the person at whose request
the crime was committed. It is noted that if an emergency
exists which demands the performance of an abortion or
other operation, it is not an illegal operation and the con-
sent of the patient will be effective under either view, or it
may be raised by implication, as in any other case. How-
ever, if the operation is absolutely necessary but the pa-
tient refuses consent, an action will probably lie if such
an operation is performed. It may be queried as to what
will constitute an emergency in cases of this nature. This
question is usually controlled by state statutes. Under
most, it would clearly appear that there must be an im-
minent danger to the life of the expectant mother or the
fetus must already be dead. If a state accepts the first view
discussed above, a doctor who performs such an operation
may be prosecuted both civilly and criminally and thus
held doubly liable. If a state accepts the second view, the
doctor is still subject to criminal prosecution. In either
event the results are extremely undesirable.
INCAPACITIES
The most complex problems relating to consent to opera-
tive procedures arise where the patient demonstrates
some incapacity which will prevent his purported consent
from having any meaning. One may be legally incapable
of consenting if he is a minor,97 non compos mentis, 5 or
otherwise unable to understand the nature and significance
190 Va. 162, 56 S.E. 2d 217 (1949).
Supra, n. 94.
7 Tabor v. Scobee, 254 :S.W. 2d 474 (Ky. 1951); Zoski v. Gaines, 271
Mich. 1, 260 N.W. 99 (1935) ; Rogers v. Sells, 178 Okla. 103, 61 P. 2d 1018
(1936).
Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal. 2d 503, 254 P. 2d 520 (1958) ; Pratt v. Davis,
224 I1. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906).
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of the situation. At common law a married woman was
also legally incapable of entering into a binding contract,
and similarly she was incapable of consenting to an opera-
tion. 9 Wisely, the law has recognized that a married
woman is as capable of determining what shall be done
with her body as an unmarried woman or a man. There-
fore, unless there are symptoms of some other incapacity,
one may rely on the consent of a married woman.
As indicated above the bases for legal incapacity to con-
sent are essentially the same as those given for entering
into a contractual relationship. To be able to consent the
patient must be able to comprehend the seriousness of his
condition, the nature of the proposed treatment or opera-
tion, the expected results, and possible consequences
thereof. If he does not have sufficient grasp of his mental
faculties so as to understand the situation when explained in
simple terms, it cannot be said that he has consented. The
theory is simply that one cannot consent to something of
which he is rationally unaware. There is actually very
little theoretical difference between the reasons why fraud
vitiates consent, and incapacity prevents the giving of
consent altogether. In the first case, as seen earlier, con-
sent is vitiated because the character of the patient's condi-
tion or the nature of the operation is misrepresented.
Thus, through the representations of the physician, the
patient is prevented from being aware of the true nature
of the medical care to which he has submitted himself. In
the case of persons who lack capacity the same reason is
applicable. The only difference is, that his comprehension
of the situation is prevented by some factor personal to
himself rather than a deliberate withholding of information
by another.
1. Minority
Due to the general lack of knowledge, experience and
reasoning power of minors, the law has made provisions for
their protection. In relation to the power of a minor to
consent to operative procedures, there is a tendency for
the courts to look more toward the intellectual maturity of
the patient than toward his age. °° It is clear that if the
State v. Housekeeper, 70 Md. 162, 16 A. 382 (1889); M'Clallen v.
Adams, 19 Pick. 333 (Mass. 1837); Burroughs v. Crichton, 49 App. D.C.
596 (D.C. 1919) ; See also 4 A.L.R. 1531 (1919).
10 Gulf & -S.I.R. Co. v. Sullivan, 155 Miss. 1, 119 So. 501, 502, 62 A.L.R.
191 (1929), the court stated that "[i]f ithe person vaccinated is at the time,
by reason of his youth, * * * incapable of understanding or appreciating
the consequences of the invasion," his assent to the invasion is not a
consent thereto.
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patient has attained his majority the courts will give recog-
nition to his consent. However, it is not always necessary
that he have attained the age of majority. In Gulf & S. I. R.
Co. v. Sullivan"' it was held that the patient, an infant of
seventeen years, was capable of consenting to being vac-
cinated since the patient understood and appreciated the
purpose for, and consequences of the vaccination. It has
been held also that the consent of the nineteen year old
infant patient was sufficient where he had consented to the
use of propane after the plaintiff parent had expressly
prohibited its use;102 and, where a twenty year old boy was
anaesthesized for the purpose of setting a broken ankle
and placing a cast thereon. 103 It is important to note that
in the first case the parent had actually refused consent,
which would have been an absolute bar to the use of pro-
pane, had the minor been unable to give consent himself.
However, although the parents were still legally responsi-
ble for the care of the child, it still being a minor and un-
emancipated, the consent of the child was given recog-
nition and not the refusal thereof by the parent.
In each of the instances mentioned above the operation
involved was relatively minor in nature and was con-
sidered to be within the comprehension of the patient.
The converse was true in Tabor v. Scobee14 wherein it was
held that the plaintiff, an infant of twenty years at the
time of the operation, could recover from the surgeon for
the removal of her Fallopian tubes during the performance
of an appendectomy, since he had failed to obtain permis-
sion to remove the tubes from the plaintiff's stepmother
and guardian. Here, of course, the operation was much
more serious and although the patient was twenty years
old she probably could not have understood the full sig-
nificance of the operation. Therefore, it was the lack of
her guardian's consent which gave rise to liability. Similar
results have been reached where an operation for the re-
moval of the tonsils of an eleven year old boy was per-
formed without the consent of his parents;10 5 where an
operation was performed on a fourteen year old boy for
the amputation of his foot in absence of the consent of
his parents;106 and where, without consent, an infant's
102 Ibid.
Bo2 ishop v. Shurly, 237 Mich. 76, 211 N.W. 75 (1926).
108 Sullivan v. Montgomery, 155 Misc. 448, 279 N.Y.S. 575 (1935).
" 254 S.W. 2d 474 (Ky. 1951).
0 Moss v. Rishworth, 222 S.W. 225 (Tex. 1920).
116 Rogers v. Sells, 178 Okla. 103, 61 P. 2d 1018 (1936).
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tonsils and adenoids were removed. °7 Thus it becomes
clear that if an operation is reasonably serious, consent
must be obtained from the minor's parent or one in a
position of loco parentis with him, but if the operation is
very minor the consent of the minor may be sufficient.
The factors to be considered in determining whether an
infant is intellectually mature enough to comprehend the
nature of his condition and the steps to be undertaken to
remedy it depend to a large extent upon the seriousness
and complexity of the operation. Regardless of the fact
that the child may be capable of consenting, it would be
wise in every case to obtain parental consent in addition to
the consent of the minor, since it is never certain that he
does understand the situation, and even if a surgeon is
sure that he does, a judge or jury may not agree.
The reader may query as to the applicability to the
emergency doctrine to cases involving infants. It is clear
that, if there is an impending danger to life or limb which
must be acted upon without delay, consent will be im-
plied.108 However, if the danger is not so imminent, it
appears that some effort must be made to obtain the con-
sent of one standing in loco parentis with the patient."9
This problem was thoroughly dealt with in Browning v.
Hoffman"' wherein the plaintiff had suffered a broken leg.
The leg was reduced and dressed and the patient retained
in the hospital. Complications arose in the form of gas
bacillus producing gangrene and amputation became neces-
sary. The amputation was duly performed without ob-
taining the consent of the patient's father, and while the
mother was objecting - she demanding that the father be
consulted. The court held that no action would lie since an
emergency situation was present and the father, being a
railroad employee, was practically unreachable. In so
holding the court said that the law imposed no duty to find
the parents and obtain their consent beyond a reasonable
and diligent effort to do so. In comparison, it was held in
Rogers v. Sells"' that the surgeon was not justified in
1
0T Zoski v. Gaines, 271 Mich. 1, 260 N.W. 99 (1935).
m Jackovach v. Yocom, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N.W. 444 (1931); Tabor v.
Scobee, 254 S.W. 2d, 474, 476 (Ky. 1951) (dictum) ; Luka v. Lowrie, 171
Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912); Sullivan v. Montgomery, 155 Misc. 448,
279 N.Y.S. 575 (1935); Moss v. Rlshworth, 222 S.W. 225 (Tex. 1920)
(dictum); Browning v. Hoffman, 90 W. Va. 568, 111 S.E. 492 (1922).
1°0Moss v. Rishworth, id., Tabor v. Scobee, id., Cf., Sullivan v. Mont-
gomery, id., which only required danger to life or health, or that suffering
or pain may be alleviated.
"°90 W. Va. 568, 111 S.E. 492 (1922).
" 178 Okla. i03, 61 P. 2d 1018 (1936).
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operating on the grounds of an emergency since the emer-
gency must be such that it precludes any delay. If, there-
fore, any delay can be taken so as to make a reasonable
effort to notify the parents or guardian of the patient, such
effort to notify must be made. This principle was made
clear by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Tabor v.
Scobee.112 The Court there said:
"But the law rightfully requires the consent of the
patient or one in loco parentis whenever it is possible
to obtain it in time. * * * The evidence indicated that
[the operation] would be necessary soon, . . . , but it
did not establish that [there] was an emergency in
the sense that death would likely ensue immedi-
ately .... .113
It would therefore appear that with regard to infants the
emergency doctrine is given a stricter interpretation, and
rightly so, since there is usually someone available who
can consent.
The question may arise as to whether, in the event of
an emergency, a surgeon may proceed to operate if the
parent refuses. It must be remembered that an adult
patient of sound mind may object to an operation even if
death will follow, and in that case consent will not be im-
plied from the circumstances. Thus, the situation may arise
wherein a parent refuses to grant the necessary consent
for an operation to be performed on the child. This prob-
lem was presented in the Browning case11sa wherein the
mother objected, desiring that her husband be notified.
Nonetheless, the court held that there was an emergency
and the surgeon was justified in proceeding. However, in
that case the court implied consent from a combination of
an existing emergency and a reasonable effort to reach the
father. Thus, it does not squarely answer the question as
to what result will be reached if both parents, or the father
rather than the mother refuses. This problem possibly can
be answered by analogy from certain doctrines discussed
in the recent Maryland case of Craig v. State"4 wherein it
was indicated that parents who demonstrate a wanton and
reckless disregard for the welfare of their children can be
held criminally liable. Since the refusal to consent may
be criminal it is arguable that this refusal of the parent
"Supra, n. 108.
"'Supra, n. 108, 476. Emphasis added.
Supra, n. 108.
"1 220 Md. 590, 155 A. 2d 684 (1959).
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would not be binding on a surgeon where the operation is
imminently necessary for the preservation of the child's
life. The theory would be that the parent by his criminal
act has made himself unavailable to consent and therefore
consent could not be obtained through a reasonable effort.11
From the above it is clear that, if an infant is not in-
tellectually matured to a point at which he can understand
his physical condition and the nature and possible conse-
quences of the proposed treatment or operation, the consent
of the parents or guardian must be obtained, unless there is
an emergency such that impending danger to the infant's
life is present.
2. Intoxicated Patients and Patients Non Compos Mentis
It is equally clear that consent by a person who is either
intoxicated or non compos mentis is invalid.11 6 These two
incapacities will be discussed together since the problems
are essentially the same although less numerous where
intoxicated persons are involved. The problem at the out-
set is in determining when a person is non compos mentis
for the purpose of giving consent. Is it necessary that he
be a danger to himself, other persons or property, as is
required in many jurisdictions in order to have him com-
mitted to a mental hospital by means of legal process, or is
some other test to be applied? Although this question has
not been directly answered by the courts, it would be
logical to surmise that since incompetency for other pur-
poses is based upon whether or not the patient is able to
comprehend the nature of his condition, a lacking of this
ability as a result of mental disease or alcohol or drugs is
all that is necessary. There are many persons who do not
constitute a danger to themselves, society or property, and
yet are unable to comprehend their physical condition or
the nature of an operation. On the other hand, the converse
is also true. Therefore, it would be illogical to use the
same test to determine mental capacity for commitment
purposes for determining capacity to consent. The stand-
ard should be one of understanding and comprehension
more analogous to the tests of sanity used to determine
the validity of a will or contract - does the patient under-
" It is noted that in order to fix criminal liability on the parent, the
court must recognize that a refusal was in fact made. However, because
the law would recognize that there was a refusal, this does not necessarily
mean that it would be binding on the surgeon. It would be inconsistent
to say that a particular act is illegal and yet legally binding on a surgeon.
116 Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal. 2d 503, 254 P. 2d 520 (1953) ; Pratt v. Davis,
224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906).
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stand the nature of a will or agreement, the dispositions or
obligations made thereunder, the nature of the property
being distributed or the nature of the actions to be taken,
and the natural objects of his bounty or his natural per-
sonal interests?" ' Such is clearly the general form of
mental test to be applied in determining one's competency
to consent. The standard is one of understanding and com-
prehension. However, if a patient has been declared legally
insane it is reasonably certain that no validity can be given
to his consent, and such must be obtained from his legal
representative which is usually a person or committee ap-
pointed by the court.
In Farber v. Olkon" s the question was presented as to
whether parental consent alone was effective. In that case
the patient, who had been mentally ill since the age of nine-
teen, brought suit by his guardian ad litem to recover for
fractures of his femur bones which resulted from shock
treatment being rendered with the consent of his father.
The court held that the father had a legal duty to care for
the son under the California Welfare and Institutions
Code"9 and that the right to consent was in the father, and
therefore, since he had given his consent, no liability could
be affixed to the doctor who had administered the shock
treatment. In so holding the court said:
"We are of the view that where an adult child is in-
competent and has no legally appointed guardian the
right to consent to such treatment resides in the parent
who has the legal responsibility to maintain such
child." 2 0
Similarly, in Pratt v. Davis"' it was held that an action
would lie against a surgeon who removed the ovaries and
uterus of a mentally ill patient without the consent of her
husband. Thus, it is clear that if the patient is mentally
incompetent, the law requires that consent be obtained
from the person legally responsible for the patient's main-
tenance and care.
The cases indicate that the doctrine of emergency ap-
plies to persons who are non compos mentis in the same
"'Doyle v. Rody, 180 Md. 471, 25 A. 2d 457 (1942); Jones v. Collins,
94 Md. 403, 51 A. 398 (1902) ; Appeal of Macveagh, 141 Me. 260, 42 A. 2d
903 (1945).
Supra, n. 116.
'CAL. WELFARE & INSTITUTIONS CODE (1956) §§ 151.5, 154, 5700 et seq.,
6726, 6559; CAL. CIVIL CoDE (1954) § 206.
"0Supra, n. 116, 524.
224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906).
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manner as it applies to persons otherwise incapacitated.
In the Farber case the court, in drawing an analogy to the
case of persons incapacitated because still in their minority,
commented:
"In case of an emergency a surgeon may operate on
a [minor] child without waiting for authority from the
parents... where it appears impractical to secure it,
but that in the absence of an emergency the parent of
such a child may lawfully consent to the operation.' 12
Therefore, the test to be applied in determining the applica-
bility of the emergency doctrine is that relating to infants,
and not that of normal persons. Following that concept it is
necessary that the emergency present an actual threat
to the life of the patient before consent can be implied. In
relation to intoxicated or drugged patients, the emergency
doctrine, as applied to those who are non compos mentis,
would logically apply. However, here the question is not
whether the surgeon can afford to delay long enough to
obtain the consent of the patient's legal representative, but
whether he can delay long enough for the effect of the
alcohol or narcotic to wear off. It is probable that only in
the case of an emergency can a surgeon feel safe in op-
erating on an intoxicated or drugged patient, since other-
wise it is not unreasonable to demand that he delay until
the consent of the patient can be obtained, provided, of
course, that the patient has reached his majority. It is
noted that in many cases an alcohol or drug addict may be
mentally ill as well as under the influence of an agent
which numbs his senses. In such cases it would be wise to
treat him as being non compos mentis, and obtain the con-
sent of his legal representative or family as well as his
consent, unless imminent peril of life is present.
An emergency operation appears to be justified under
the normal test for the use of that doctrine if the patient
when brought to the hospital is unconscious, in need of an
operation to preserve life, limb or health, and is later
found to be non compos mentis. Unless there are present
clear symptoms or evidence that the patient is non compos
mentis or otherwise incapacitated, a surgeon may feel rea-
sonably safe in operating, if the situation constitutes an
emergency under the rule applicable to normal, adult
persons. Although this question has not arisen to date, it
Supra, n. 116, 524, partially quoting from 70 C.J.S., Physicians and
Surgeons, § 48, p. 968.
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is logical that the law only require that the surgeon act
reasonably. He cannot be expected to diagnose the mental
condition of the patient without being able to talk with
him or someone who has personal knowledge of his per-
sonality and habits. It would, therefore, seems logical that
such an operation may be performed so long as a reasonable
practitioner or surgeon would not be put on notice of
mental disease.
If, in the absence of an emergency situation, the patient
voluntarily submits to treatment or requests treatment, but
shows signs of being non compos mentis his consent is
probably invalid. It seems reasonable that if, after talk-
ing with the patient and considering the circumstances in
which medical aid was sought, the physician should rea-
sonably conclude that the patient does not comprehend
what he is requesting or to what he is submitting himself,
consent will not be implied. It is clear that, if a minor
child so submits himself to or requests medical care, the
physician will be held liable unless he is certain that the
child can comprehend the nature of his condition and of
the remedial measures to be taken.23 By analogy it would
follow that the physician must make the same determina-
tion with regard to mentally ill persons. However, there
is less likelihood that one who is not seriously mentally ill,
and yet lacking comprehension, will be noticed, since the
age of an individual is a more tangible thing to detect; and
at the outset, it will act to place a physician on notice of
possible incompetency. Nonetheless, care must be taken in
each case to ascertain the mental condition of the patient
for otherwise there is a definite possibility of being liable
for such medical care as is rendered. The test is simply
whether a reasonable physician would be put on notice of
the incapacity. It might be queried as to whether there
would be liability, if after treatment is rendered or an op-
eration is completed, it is discovered that the patient was
mentally defective. In such a case it seems logical that the
surgeon would not be liable unless prior to operating he
should have detected the mental condition. It is noted that
in the case of drugged or intoxicated persons the theories
discussed in relation to the preceding two problems ap-
ply, since there is no emergency and it would not be too
inconvenient to delay until the person has regained his
mental faculties and then obtain his consent.
'mGulf & S.I.R. Co. v. Sullivan, 155 Miss. 1, 119 So. 501, 502, 62 A.L.R.
191 (1929).
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From whom should the physician obtain consent if the
patient is non compos mentis? The answer to this question
is rather complex and requires the asking of several others.
Assuming that the patient has a family and is either not
committed to a mental hospital or is committed upon two
doctor's certificates,lsa from whom should consent be ob-
tained? It is clear in this instance that consent should
be obtained from the family, as in the case of an infant.
The particular member of the family would depend upon
who is responsible or who has assumed the responsibility
for the care and maintenance of the patient.'24 As in the
case of infants the law places a duty on such persons to
make all decisions of this nature for the incompetent
person. Thus a spouse should answer for the other
spouse, 25 a parent - preferably the father - for an un-
married person who has been incompetent since youth,12 6
a son or daughter for his or her parent where the son or
daughter has assumed the responsibility for the care of
the parent, or any other relative or non-relative who has
been providing for the support of the patient. Suppose,
however, that the patient has been married and divorced
and has no other family, must the divorced husband give
his consent? If there are children of a responsible age who
have assumed the care of the patient, there is no need to
try to locate the husband. But, if there are no children, the
consent of the husband, who is obligated to support the
patient by alimony payments, is probably necessary unless
it would be futile to attempt to obtain it. Where the
patient and the husband have been absolutely divorced,
a vinculo matrimonii, it is doubtful that the mere obliga-
tion to provide alimony payments is a legal duty to provide
care and support sufficient to make it necessary to obtain
his consent to perform an operation of the non compos
wife. However, where the divorce was merely a divorce
a mensa et thoro, a legal separation, there may well be a
sufficient duty. 27 In any case it would be wise to seek to
have the patient declared mentally incompetent by a court
before operative procedures are undertaken. Consent
'2 5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 59, § 31.
Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal. 2d 503, 254 P. 2d 520 (1953).
For a discussion of the duty of a husband to maintain and care for his
wife, see McCaddin v. McCaddin, 116 Md. 567, 82 A. 554 (1911). Also see,
Short v. Short, 151 Md. 444, 135 A. 176 (1926) (duty of husband for
maintenance and care of wife continues after separation where she is
suffering from a mental disorder). See also In re Mogus, 73 F. Supp.
150 (D.O.W.D. Pa. 1947).
12 Farber v. Olkon, supra, n. 124.
127 Short v. Short, 151 Md. 444, 135 A. 176 (1926).
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would then be given by a committee appointed by the
court to represent the patient.
Where the converse of the above situation is present -
the husband is the one who is incompetent - it would
probably be necessary to have him declared mentally in-
competent by a court, unless there can be found some
relative or friend who has assumed the care and mainte-
nance of the patient. In this case it cannot be argued that
the wife is obliged to care for her divorced husband on the
basis of an alimony decree. However, there may be some
basis for requiring her consent if she or he has only ob-
tained a legal separation. Whether or not such an obliga-
tion can be imposed has not been decided by the courts,
but regardless of the fact that an obligation could possibly
exist, a physician will be protected if consent is obtained
through legal process.
Assuming that the patient enters a mental hospital on
a voluntary petition and possesses no family or person
who has assumed responsibility for his care, from whom
must consent be obtained if treatment or operative proce-
dures are needed? If the patient has demonstrated his
understanding of his condition sufficiently to realize that
psychiatric help is necessary, it may be that he will under-
stand a need for special treatment or for an operation.
In that case his consent will probably suffice. But, suppose
that after admittance the patient has deteriorated mentally
so that he is no longer capable of understanding the nature
of either his physical or mental condition, is his consent
then valid? In such a case it would be necessary for the
hospital to petition a court to declare the patient mentally
incompetent and to appoint a committee. Consent would
thereafter be obtained from the committee. It is noted
that many administrative heads of psychiatric hospitals
often assume the responsibility in these circumstances,
but, legally speaking, they are guilty of a tort even if they
do not perform the operation themselves, since they set
in motion the means through which the operation was
performed.
Finally, where a patient has been committed to a mental
hospital by court order and needs either surgery or treat-
ment a committee is generally appointed to act on his
behalf, and it is from this committee that consent must be
obtained. However, the situation may arise wherein the
committee has conflicting opinions with the patient's
family. In this event it is reasonably clear that the com-
mittee is the legal representative of the patient and if it
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is in disagreement with members of the patient's family
it will be the committee's decision which will be binding.
Thus, in absence of an emergency which presents im-
minent peril to life, when dealing with persons who are
non compos mentis or otherwise incapacitated, the phy-
sician must determine who possesses a legal duty to
maintain and care for the patient, and obtain consent from
him before he can be safe in rendering treatment or in
operating.
CONCLUSION
General Rule: Before an operation may be performed,
or treatment rendered, it is necessary for a surgeon or
physician to obtain the consent of his patient, if he is
mentally capable of giving it, or if not, of his guardian,
unless the circumstances are such that they demand im-
mediate attention for the preservation of his life, limb
or health. Where an operation is required by law there is
no necessity to obtain consent since such is provided.by
the statute which makes the operation mandatory. In other
cases consent may be express, implied in fact, or implied
in law. Express consent may be either written or oral,
and in either case be just as effective, except that should
litigation arise the existence of the latter will be more
difficult to prove. Implied consent may arise in many
circumstances, the most common being where there is a
request for medical assistance, or consent to a related
operation, or consent to a more serious operation, or where
an emergency is present. It is important to recognize that
with regard to emergencies there are probably two tests
to determine if one actually exists: (1) does the condition
of the patient present an imminent danger to life, limb or
health; and (2) with regard to minors and other persons
incapable of consenting, is there such a danger to the
patient's life that a reasonable effort to locate his parent
or guardian in order to obtain consent cannot be made?
Finally, it must be borne in mind that if consent is obtained
through fraud, coercion or mistake it will be vitiated; and
if the operation to be performed is illegal, consent thereto
will have no effect in some jurisdictions, while in others it
will constitute an estoppel and prevent the patient or his
estate from recovering in an action at law.
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